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Eesti riigireiting A-

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  • Standard@Poors tõstis äsja Eesti riigireitingut, varsti on meie juhtaktsiad ilmselt jälle kenas tõusus.Millised on vastukajad?
  • Telekom ja Hansa lähevad homme jälle liikuma...
  • Riigireitingu tõstmine A peale on väga oluline, sest paljud fondid võivad investeerida vaid riikidesse, mille reiting on A,seega on oodata välisraha tulekut meie juhtettevõtete aktsiatesse
  • Vaevalt, et nüüd Eesti ettevõtete (tln börsi) aktsiaid see väga mõjutab. Aga kavandatavale Eesti võlakirjade emissioonile on see küll ülimalt positiivne uudis ja peaks kindlustama emissiooni õnnestumise. Good for us!
  • Ilves,
    see järjekord on ikka tagurpidi,
    alati kui keegi kavandab võlakirjaemissiooni küsivad võlamüügi korraldajad võlakirjade müüjalt(niisiis Eestilt) reitingut,

    nii et kui, hakati võlakirjaemissiooni tegema telliti ka reiting - s.t. hea on muidugi et tuli varasemast kõrgem reiting, aga vaevalt emissioon oleks ära jäänud
  • Kas keegi võiks avaldada reitinguagentuuride (Standard & Poors, Moody`s) reitingud ja selle sisu?
  • EKRE, Keskerakonna ja Isamaa "majandus" "poliitika" viljad hakkavad nüüd välja paistma.

    Riigireitingu downgrade ja kõik peavad paarkümmend bps rohkem laenu maksma.

    Eesti Pank: STATISTIKATEADE. Tähtajaliste hoiuste intressid ja maht kasvasid ka juunis

    Eesti majapidamiste laenude ja liisingute jääk 12,7 mld eurot.

    Eesti ettevõtete laenude ja liisingute jääk 11,3 mld eurot.


    Laenud kokku 24 bn EUR. 20 bps sellelt mahult on 48 000 000 EUR aastas. LIhtsalt seetõttu, et ei suudetud kulutamist ja püsikulusid vältida.



    Fitch Ratings: Fitch Downgrades Estonia to 'A+'; Outlook Stable
    Fitch Ratings - Frankfurt am Main - 28 Jul 2023: Fitch Ratings has downgraded Estonia's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'A+' from 'AA-'. The Outlook is Stable.

    A full list of rating actions is at the end of this rating action commentary.


    KEY RATING DRIVERS
    The downgrade of Estonia's IDRs reflects the following key rating drivers and their relative weights:

    High

    Deteriorating Public Finances: The downgrade reflects a deterioration in public finances. General government debt is forecast to rise to 21.1% of GDP at end-2023 and remain on an upward path in the medium term, despite fiscal consolidation measures introduced in June. While debt/GDP will remain low compared with the peer median of 54.0%, it is more than double the level when Fitch upgraded Estonia to 'AA-' in 2018 (8.2%), when the agency anticipated debt/GDP to be stable. This reflects a loosening of the historically tight fiscal stance, aggravated by the war in Ukraine and the pandemic.

    Looser Fiscal Stance: The 2023 budget targeted a deficit of 4.2% of GDP, up from a deficit of 0.9% in 2022, owing to an increase in social transfers, higher public sector wages, a rise in the tax-free income threshold and multi-year commitments on military and education spending. Discomfort over the debt trajectory at a time of rising financing costs saw the new government, formed in April, introduce a package of consolidation measures. These chiefly take effect from the start of 2024, with the largest being a hike in VAT.

    In addition, corporate income tax, gambling taxes and excise duties will be raised and an increase in child allowances will be partially reversed. Additional measures are pending, although their full impact may not emerge until 2025.

    Deficits Despite New Measures: Fitch forecasts a deficit of 3.6% of GDP this year, reflecting the strong performance over the first five months and expenditure restraint by the new government. The deficit should then narrow to 2.6% in 2024 and 2% in 2025 due to the new revenue-raising measures. Fitch has been cautious in applying the government projections on the impact of its June tax package on the understanding that these do not incorporate the potential impact on growth and other key variables.

    We assume that the current planned additional measures are implemented for 2025 and that new environmental fees will be introduced. Further fiscal adjustment may be tough, given the extent of the planned tightening and the popularity of recent spending commitments.

    Debt on Upward Trajectory: Fiscal deficits will put general government debt/GDP on an upward trend. Fitch forecasts debt/GDP to rise to 23.1% by end-2025 from 18.4% at end-2022 and the agency's debt dynamics show a continued gradual increase to 25.1% by end-2027. Government debt/GDP was below 10% until 2020, with the general government balance averaging a surplus of 0.1% over the preceding decade. The lack of measures to close the gap caused by the pillar two pension withdrawals (which have been allowed since January 2021) raises questions about the long-term sustainability of the pension system.

    Estonia's 'A+' IDRs also reflect the following key rating drivers:

    Growth Challenges: Real GDP growth has remained weak. A 0.6% qoq decline in real GDP growth (down 3.2% yoy) in 1Q and weak high frequency indicators for 2Q point to a second consecutive year of contraction (the -1.3% growth in 2022 was the worst in the EU). The economy is being hit by the sanctions on Russia and Belarus, which have disrupted supply chains for some industries, and the weakness of the Nordic real estate sector, a major market for Estonia manufacturing. Growth should pick up later this year as real wages return to positive territory, although a likely rebuilding of household savings will temper the growth in consumption. All in all, we expect the Estonian economy to contract by 1.6% this year.

    A further rebound in real incomes, reviving credit growth, a recovery in key trading partners should lift real GDP growth to 3.5% in 2024, despite the impact of tax hikes.

    Uncertainty About Competitiveness: In Fitch's opinion, it is too early to determine whether there has been structural damage to Estonia's competitiveness. In part, this reflects the interconnected nature of the two shocks the economy is facing. Unit labour costs and the real effective exchange rate have appreciated strongly against EU averages for a sustained period and the current account has been in deficit in the past few years due to a deterioration in the trade balance.

    However, the current account deficit is reversing and an EU study from earlier this year found competitiveness losses so far were small. Furthermore, local economists believe the real GDP numbers are understated due to issues with GDP deflators, and corporate and bank balance sheets are strong.

    Inflation High but Falling: Inflation has fallen and was 9.2% in June, from a peak of 25.2% in August 2022, largely due to falling energy prices. Food prices are now the main source of inflation and should decline in line with lower commodity prices, although the pass-through has been slower than usual. Fitch forecasts inflation to fall to around 5% at end year and average 9.7%, above the 'A' median of 6.2%. The planned tax hikes could add around 2pp to inflation in 2024, when we forecast it to average 4.3%. Average inflation is expected to ease further, to 3.1% in 2025. The shock to inflation does not appear to have unanchored long-term inflation expectations.

    Strong Banking Sector: The largely foreign-owned banking sector is in a strong position, and is well capitalised (Tier 1 capital ratio of 27.1% at end-1Q), liquid and currently highly profitable due to growth in net interest margins. Non-performing loans have stayed on a downward trend and were 0.8% at end-April 2023. Banks have not reported any impact from higher interest rates on the servicing of their mortgage portfolios, even though virtually all mortgages are floating rate, as they are stressed well above current interest rates at origination.


    ESG - Governance: Estonia has an ESG Relevance Score (RS) of '5[+]' for both Political Stability and Rights and for the Rule of Law, Institutional and Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption. Theses scores reflect the high weight that the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) have in our proprietary Sovereign Rating Model. Estonia has a high WBGI ranking at 87th percentile, reflecting its long track record of stable and peaceful political transitions, well established rights for participation in the political process, strong institutional capacity, effective rule of law and a low level of corruption.


    RATING SENSITIVITIES
    Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative Rating Action/Downgrade

    -Public Finances
    : A significant and persistent increase in general government debt/GDP for example stemming from continued pressure on expenditure or a weakening of growth that undermines revenues.

    -Macro: A structural deterioration in medium-term growth prospects reflecting clear evidence of a weakening in competitiveness.

    -Structural: A substantial worsening of geopolitical risks with adverse consequences for economic growth and the fiscal policy.


    Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive Rating Action/Upgrade

    -Public Finances
    : A fiscal stance consistent with placing debt/GDP on a firm downward path over the medium term, potentially reflecting additional consolidation measures and stronger prospects for revenues.

    -Macro/Structural: Evidence that growth prospects, competitiveness and inflation have been unaffected by recent shocks.


    SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) AND QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)
    Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Estonia a score equivalent to a rating of 'A+' on the Long-Term Foreign-Currency (LT FC) IDR scale.

    Fitch's sovereign rating committee did not adjust the output from the SRM to arrive at the final LT FC IDR.


    Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centred averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within our criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully reflected in the SRM.


    Country Ceiling
    The Country Ceiling for Estonia is 'AAA', four notches above the LT FC IDR and at the upper limit of the rating scale. This reflects very strong constraints and incentives, relative to the IDR, against capital or exchange controls being imposed that would prevent or significantly impede the private sector from converting local currency into foreign currency and transferring the proceeds to non-resident creditors to service debt payments.

    Fitch's Country Ceiling Model produced a starting point uplift of +3 notches above the IDR. Fitch's rating committee applied a further +1 notch qualitative adjustment to this, under the Long-Term Institutional Characteristics pillar, reflecting the sovereign's membership of the eurozone currency union and the associated reserve currency status. The agency views the risk of the imposition of capital or exchange controls within the eurozone as exceptionally low but not negligible.


    BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO
    International scale credit ratings of Sovereigns, Public Finance and Infrastructure issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction) of three notches over three years. The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical performance. For more information about the methodology used to determine sector-specific best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings, visit https://www.fitchratings.com/site/re/10111579.


    REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF RATING
    The principal sources of information used in the analysis are described in the Applicable Criteria.

    ESG CONSIDERATIONS
    Estonia has an ESG Relevance Score of '5[+]' for Political Stability and Rights as World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and a key rating driver with a high weight. As Estonia has a percentile rank above 50 for the respective Governance Indicator, this has a positive impact on the credit profile.

    Estonia has an ESG Relevance Score of '5[+]' for Rule of Law, Institutional & Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption as World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and are a key rating driver with a high weight. As Estonia has a percentile rank above 50 for the respective Governance Indicators, this has a positive impact on the credit profile.

    Estonia has an ESG Relevance Score of '4[+]'for Human Rights and Political Freedoms as the Voice and Accountability pillar of the World Bank Governance Indicators is relevant to the rating and a rating driver. As Estonia has a percentile rank above 50 for the respective Governance Indicator, this has a positive impact on the credit profile.

    Estonia has an ESG Relevance Score of '4[+]' for Creditor Rights as willingness to service and repay debt is relevant to the rating and is a rating driver for Estonia, as for all sovereigns. As Estonia has a track record of 20+ years without a restructuring of public debt and captured in our SRM variable, this has a positive impact on the credit profile.

    Except for the matters discussed above, the highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity, either due to their nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the entity. For more information on Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores, visit www.fitchratings.com/esg.







  • Äkki need hoopis Reformierakonna "majanduspoliitika" viljad? Minul on selgelt meeles kuidas Reformierakond enne valimis jagas põhimõtteliselt kõigile sügisel 50 eurot näpuvahele ja hääletas peretoetuste suurendamise poolt, kuigi raha selleks riigil ei olnud ja tehti seda siis laenuraha arvelt. Ja viimased 3 rahandusministrit on olnud ju Reformierakonnast. See 50 eurot kõigile nn tasuta raha läks riigieelarvele vist 60 000 000 maksma ning samalajal suurendas niigi kõrget inflatsiooni. See mida me täna näeme on pigem viimase 3 aasta valede ja priiskavate otsuste tulemus.
  • Allakäigutrepil on seekord olemas konkreetne kuupäev.

    4. mai 2017. Teleuudistes oli peaminister.

    "Me ei ela tuleviku arvel. Me kasutame ära varem kogutud ülejäägi 2018, 2019, 2020. Ja 2021 on eelarve jälle tasakaalus."

    2017 kevadel oli Eesti majanduskasv toonase tsükli tipptasemel...

    Ja ei, toona polnud peaministrierakond oravakujulise maskotiga.
  • "Tervist Teile"
    Äkki need hoopis Reformierakonna "majanduspoliitika" viljad? ...See 50 eurot kõigile nn tasuta raha läks riigieelarvele vist 60 000 000 maksma ning samalajal suurendas niigi kõrget inflatsiooni.

    Väga nõus, see oli ikka väga idiootne, mindi raha külvamisest tekkinud inflatsiooni ravima raha külvamisega.
    Lisaks võib Reformi süüks arvata ka nõustumise Isamaa nõutud peretoetuste suurendamisega eelmisel aastal, vastukaubana siis selle eest, et Isamaa oleks nõus Keski koalitsioonis välja vahetama. Kõigile oli selge, et riigieelarve ei kannata seda jama välja.
    Siiski vähemalt praegune valitsus üldjoontes teeb siiski õiget asja, et eelarve defitsiiti vähendab.

  • Vastupidi... 1) riigieelarve ei kannata välja maksuküüru kaotamist; 2) ainus pika perspektiiviga lahendus on rahvastiku kasv, või vähemalt kahanemise peatumine. Ainult sellesse tasub investeerida, kõik muu on tilulilu.
  • Väidetavalt on Reformierakonna maksuküüru kaotamise mõju riigieelarvele ligikaugu 400 000 000. Samas sellest võidavad pigem kõrgemapalgalised kellele see ca 100 euro lisandumine kuus erilist mõju ei oma. Kõik need Reformierakonna automaksud, käibemaksu tõstmine on selleks vajalikud, et nn maksuküüru kaotamisest puudu jääv osa ära tasandada. Lisaks, selle asemel, et otsustavalt kärpida riigieelarve suureks paisunud kulutusi, kaotada näiteks nn tasuta ühistransport, toimub valitsuses asendustegevus. See, et Reformierakond oli nõus peretoetuste tõstmise poolt hääletama, samas teades, et selleks ehk uute püsikulude maksmiseks tuleb laenu võtta, iseloomustabki minu arvates tänast riigijuhtimist ja vastutustunde ning kompetentsi puudumist.


  • PM: "Rah. min finants- ja maksupoliitika asekantsleri Evelyn Liivamägi sõnul on maksuküüru muutmise mõju 2025. aastal 340, 2026. aastal 257 ja 2027. aastal 264 miljonit eurot ja see raha jääb inimestele kätte."
    ...ja läheb tarbimisse vast?
  • Sellest 340 000 000 eurost võib kohe maha võtta 120 000 000 eurot, mille valitsus kogub kohe tagasi. See 100 eurot mis kõrgemapalgalistele Reformierakond edaspidi ühes uus rohkem kätte jätab pigem ei lähe samas mahus kohalikku tarbimisse tagasi. Seda selle pärast, et kõrgemapalgalised reisivad rohkem, investeerivad rohkem ja ostavad kallimaid kaupu, millele kulutatud raha liigub pigem riigist välja. Põhimõtteliselt otse öeldes korjatakse vaesematelt või neilt kes elavad palgapäevast palgapäevani automaksuna ja tõstetud käibemaksuna mingi summa rohkem käest ära ja antakse kõrgemapalgalistele ehk siis see 100 eurot kuus juurde, tasandab põhimõtteliselt ära jõukamate automaksu ja suureneva käibemaksukulu.
  • Siiski, ka 220 milli majandusse suunata pole ju paha. Palju välismaa kaupadest ostetakse siiski kohalikelt firmadelt.
  • Pigem ei suunata majandusse juurde vaid Reformierakond jagab selle ümber. Enne tarbisid selle raha ära vaesemad, nüüd aga jõukamad. Raha ju ümberjagades juurde ei teki.
  • See kõik toimub ju majanduses (mitte EMTA kontodel) st. elavdavat mõju võiks nagu kah olla. Esialgu automüüjad hõõruvad avalikult käsi, aga eks paljud teisedki saavad osa.
  • Fitch toob reitingulangetuse kahe põhipõhjusena välja:
    - General government debt is forecast to rise to 21.1%
    - The 2023 budget targeted a deficit of 4.2% of GDP,

    Vaatasin huvi pärast, millised on need näitajad nendel riikidel, kes on Fitchi AAA reitinguga (4 taset kõrgem kui Eesti A+):

    General government gross debt (Percent of GDP):
    Australia 55.7%
    Denmark 29.7%
    Germany 66.5%
    Luxembourg 24.3%
    Netherlands 48.5%
    Norway 39.6%
    Singapore 134.2%
    Sweden 31.7%
    Switzerland 39.1%
    United States 134.1%

    Government budget surplus/-deficit (Percent of GDP):
    Australia -10.1%
    Denmark -4.0%
    Germany -14.1%
    Luxembourg 0.4%
    Netherlands −8.7%
    Norway −1.8%
    Singapore −10.8%
    Sweden −5.9%
    Switzerland −4.2%
    United States −18.7%
  • "toonik"
    Vastupidi... 1) riigieelarve ei kannata välja maksuküüru kaotamist; 2) ainus pika perspektiiviga lahendus on rahvastiku kasv, või vähemalt kahanemise peatumine. Ainult sellesse tasub investeerida, kõik muu on tilulilu.


    1. Erakordsed idiootsused tuleb kaotada. Kui on soovi, siis üheks võimaluseks on klassikaline astmeline tulumaks, mis on erakorralisest idiootsusest parem lahendus, kuigi ma seda ei poolda.

    2. Soovitad investeerida immigratsiooni toetamisesse? Ühtegi teist vahendit rahvastiku kahanemise peatamiseks ei ole. Jah, sündivust saab toetada, ega loomulikku iivet see positiivseks ei tõsta. Eluea tõus ka, aga ega see vanurite osakaalu kasv rahvast tugevamaks ei tee.

    Tegelikult ongi kontrollitud immigratsioon, eesti keele kaitse ja immigrantide järkjärguline assimilatsioon ainsaks võimaluseks selle tagamiseks, et eesti keel, rahvas, kultuur, riik püsiks pikemas perspektiivis. Sünde naise kohta me üle kahe ei tõsta mingi nipiga.



  • Postimehe juhtkiri seoses praeguse saamatu ja korrast ära lastud rahandusega valitsuse tegevuse tõttu Eesti allalastud riigireitingust. Seal artiklis on päris hästi kohhu võetud praegune olukord mis puutub meie riigi praegusesse nn juhtmisse ja rahanduspoliitikasse,
  • "Vanaema"
    "toonik"
    Vastupidi... 1) riigieelarve ei kannata välja maksuküüru kaotamist; 2) ainus pika perspektiiviga lahendus on rahvastiku kasv, või vähemalt kahanemise peatumine. Ainult sellesse tasub investeerida, kõik muu on tilulilu.


    1. Erakordsed idiootsused tuleb kaotada. Kui on soovi, siis üheks võimaluseks on klassikaline astmeline tulumaks, mis on erakorralisest idiootsusest parem lahendus, kuigi ma seda ei poolda.

    2. Soovitad investeerida immigratsiooni toetamisesse? Ühtegi teist vahendit rahvastiku kahanemise peatamiseks ei ole. Jah, sündivust saab toetada, ega loomulikku iivet see positiivseks ei tõsta. Eluea tõus ka, aga ega see vanurite osakaalu kasv rahvast tugevamaks ei tee.

    Tegelikult ongi kontrollitud immigratsioon, eesti keele kaitse ja immigrantide järkjärguline assimilatsioon ainsaks võimaluseks selle tagamiseks, et eesti keel, rahvas, kultuur, riik püsiks pikemas perspektiivis. Sünde naise kohta me üle kahe ei tõsta mingi nipiga.





    See on allaandja eneseõigustav jutt, sellistega pole mõtet riiki edasi ehitada.
    PS Samost viitas oma jutusaates mingile teadlaste põhjalikule uuringule, mille väitel peretoetused on aidanud sündimust tõsta. Viidet kahjuks ei osanud leida.
  • Toetused hoiavad lihtsalt katastroofi ära. Ilma nendeta võiks olla pilt veel süngem. Ei näe seda võluvitsa, millega sündide arv naise kohta võiks üle 2 tõusta ja pole seda retsepti suutnud ka ükski teine arenenud riik välja mõelda.

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