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Kes on Jim Cramer?

Kommentaari jätmiseks loo konto või logi sisse

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    James Crameri nimi jookseb üsna paljudest USA aktsiaturuga seotud kommentaaridest läbi, isegi Äripäev tsiteeris teda mõni aeg tagasi. Kes see mees siis on? 

    Kindlasti üsna huvitav isiksus, koloriitne on võib-olla isegi vähe öeldud. Aastatel 1988-2000 juhtis hedge-fondi Cramer Berkowitz Partners, kusjuures pea igal aastal ületati turu tootlust. Aastal 2000 otsustas ta sellest ärist välja tulla, pidev pinge tekitab ilmselt päris suure stressi. Aastal 2000 lahkumine oli ka ilmselt üsna hea ajastus. Lahkuma ei sundinud teda kindlasti rasked ajad, viimasel aastal teeniti veel 36% tootlust, kuigi turg lõpetas juba miinuses.

    Kuigi www.thestreet.com uudisteportaali lõi (või õigemini oli üks loojatest) ta juba varem, siis viimastel aastatel on ta peamiselt sellele pühendanud, olles kindlasti seal kõige rohkem silmapaistev kirjutaja. Peamiselt on ta tegev antud saidi tasulisel poolel (www.realmoney.com) ja ta omab seal personaalset portfelli www.actionalerts.com , kus ta avaldab oma aktsiavalikud veel enne seda kui ta ise ostab. Viimasel aastal on tal seal väga hästi läinud ja seetõttu see teenus ka üsna populaarne. TheStreet.com (TSCM) kaupleb ka Nasdaqil.

    Cramer võitleb igal rindel, esineb üsna tihti televisioonis (eelkõige CNBC), kirjutab raamatuid ja omab ka isiklikku raadioshow'd (kliki siin). Viimane on päris naljakas kuulamine - kuigi ta mõtted on üsnagi õiged, meenutab tema kõnemaneer Elu Sõna pastori oma. Olen lugenud raamatut tema kohta ("Trading with the enemy") ja see oli selline hea meelelahutus, lisaks aitab mõista börside telgitagust. Ka Crameri enda raamatud pidid olema üsna avameelsed.

    Ma ise olen realmoney.com'i lugenud pea selle algusaegadest ja see 20 USD kuus on üsna asjalikult kulutatud raha, huvitavaid mõtteid saab sealt pidevalt. Crameri ideededele pole ma otsest rakendust leidnud, aga ilmselt minu lähenemine turgudele on tema omast piisavalt erinev.

  • Ahjaa, lisaks üks värske intervjuu Crameriga - kliki siin.

  • Ega otsest põhjust polnudki :) Viimasel ajal mitmed kliendid ka küsinud, et kes see tüüp on kellele üsna tihti viidatakse.

    Ja eks ole USA turul tegutsejal kindlasti kasulik teada, kes see Cramer on.

    Mis teised temast arvavad kes tema tegemistega tuttavad?
  • Ma olen vaadanud teda telest (CNBC "Kudlow & Cramer").
    Minu jaoks natuke liiga narviline tuup. Kui ei oleks rahulikku ja tunduvalt asjalikumat Kudlow'it korval, oleks nende saade uks husteeriline tomblemine, kus saatekulalisel usna raske oma motteid lopetada.
    Aga kusimused on teravad ja reageerimine kiire, selle eest tuleb kiita, kull aga jatab soovida pusivus ja oma emotsioonide vaoshoitus.
    Monikord arritub nii, et isegi saatekulaline ei suuda naeru pidada, televaatajast raakimata:)
  • Crameri raamatud oli minu jaoks paari aasta eest täielikuks eye-openeriks. Ühe kirjutas tema hedge fundis töötanud noor kaupleja (Trading with The Enemy) ning teise ta ise (Confessions of a Street Addict).

    K: Kuidas edukalt ja kiiresti lühikeseks müügiga raha teenida?

    V: Kõigepealt tuleb ennast päev varem lühikeseks müüa ja siis saata noor tüüp järgmisel hommikul firma conference callile ja lasta küsida üle kogu saali: "WHEN THE F*CK ARE YOU GOING TO ISSUE THAT PROFIT WARNING?"

    Tunni pärast ilmub areenile suur müüja, kes viib hinna 1-1.5 pt alla.


    Soovitan soojalt kõigile, kel kauplemisega mingisugust seost.


    sB
  • Äkki on kellegil huvitav lugeda, kopeerin siia ühe tänase loo. Autoriks üks Crameri kolleege, minu silmis üsna kõrge respektiga Doug Kass.

    ----

    Holidays are for fun, family and reflection, especially as we near the year's end. I will concentrate on the reflection part today and hopefully will give Street Insight subscribers -- especially our relatively new subscribers -- a sense of the factors that have molded my investment persona.

    Fifty-some-odd years ago, I embarked on a rich personal and professional life full of successes and failures. Never dull, I have tried to embrace life and the markets with gusto and anticipation.

    Soon after my birth, the Dow Jones Industrial Average embarked on a new bull market rally from about 160 to over 300 by the beginning of the 1950s. In 1950, the largest monthly change in the DJIA for the full year was only 14 points!

    My grandmother, Grandma Koufax, was a great stock trader and investor. She owned her own business well before it was fashionable for women to be entrepreneurs. She was well ahead of her time. By the time I was 16 years old, she had taught me to chart stocks in a small notebook that I kept with me at all times. I charted my imaginary "holdings" daily, and spent my Christmas and Easter holidays in a Long Island brokerage office watching the tape all day (at that time the market was only open for a few hours each day) as if I was watching a movie. My preoccupation with the markets, especially during those holidays, led some of my friends to think that I was weird. In retrospect, they were insightful!

    I made my first real trade while getting my MBA at Wharton. After weeks of analysis, I bought a couple of shares of Teledyne (TDY:NYSE - commentary - research) (and I really mean just a couple!). Run by Dr. Henry Singleton, it was the Google (GOOG:Nasdaq - commentary - research) of its time, a stock of the decade that went up nearly tenfold. With the proceeds of that first big trade, I purchased my first automobile, a Triumph sports car. By then, I was immersed in the stock market -- you could say I was almost addicted -- even before I had my first job on the Street.

    At Wharton, I learned the theories behind portfolio management and securities analysis on the way to getting my MBA. While at the University of Pennsylvania, I met Ralph Nader and I co-authored Citibank: The Ralph Nader Report with Ralph and the Center for the Study of Responsive Law. My contribution to that book also became my master's thesis.

    My first job was as a housing analyst at the venerable brokerage firm Kidder Peabody. I learned how to prepare company spreadsheets and about the integrity of independent analysis under Director of Research Johann Gouws, who had successfully led one of the first research boutiques (H.C. Wainright) into prominence earlier. Interestingly, my office was next to Julian Robertson, soon to be of Tiger Management, who at the time was a retail broker!

    After a few years, I ended up at Putnam Management, considered one of the premier money managers extant, in Boston. I worked under two individuals, Larry Lasser and Jerry Jordan (The Chief), who profoundly influenced my career by teaching me how to logically process data and to succinctly develop that data into a well-reasoned and profitable analytical conclusion. Jerry, in particular, taught me how and when to press an investment decision -- a technique that is quite important in the hedge fund business today.

    Glickenhaus & Co. was my next stop, where I honed my money management skills under the talented and legendary Seth Glickenhaus. It is through his influence that I became a contrarian and began to regularly take variant views against the market's prevailing bias. I had my own money management firm during most of the 1980s and, while experiencing some periods of success, I learned the importance of a team.

    In the late 1980s, I acquired a large 13-D position in a NYSE-listed company, thinking that I was going to become the next takeover king. I quickly learned to stick to my knitting -- analyzing and investing, not taking over companies.

    But I should digress. During the mid-1980s I took up driving harness horses as a hobby. I broke a world record and one of my horses, Kassa Branca (a play on words from the movie Casablanca and named for me and Brooklyn Dodger pitching great Ralph Branca), won a million-dollar race! Unfortunately in 1990, I was almost killed in a harness racing accident while driving in a race in Pennsylvania. I was in a body cast and wheelchair for nearly two years, and I still feel the physical pain daily.

    The supine position gives one a lot of time to contemplate one's future.

    By 1992, I was able to work again (though I still could not walk unaided) and while running the research and institutional department at First Albany, I met Alan Abelson of Barron's. That relationship led to a cover story that I wrote for Barron's on Marvel Entertainment (a negative assessment of Marvel's prospects, and the company ultimately filed bankruptcy). That start was followed by approximately 30 interviews and articles over the years in Abelson's column or in other areas of Barron's.

    I believe my relationships with Ralph Nader and Alan Abelson as well as my period of time reflecting on life after my accident importantly framed the manner in which I have viewed markets and companies -- a glass half empty, if you will.

    A stint with the remarkable Leon Cooperman at Omega Advisors taught me the tough hedge fund game and independence of analysis, after which I started my own partnerships, which I have had for nearly seven years.

    I sit here grateful and satisfied, though looking forward to the continued challenges presented by the markets with enthusiasm and excitement.

    It seems as if I have never had a dull moment in the investment business over the last three decades. What moves me is that it seems that there are new and different variables to consider every day, and with over 6,000 publicly-traded securities, projects are rarely duplicated.

  • Ma lisan ühe enda heietuse ka siia. Istusin mina eelkooli ukse taga last oodates ja lugesin Jim Crameri nn rohelist raamatut. Seal oli ka teisi lapsevanemaid. Minu kõrval istuv preili tundis ühel hetkel huvi, et mida ma loen. Näitasin talle raamatu kaant. Tema omakorda läks silmnähtavalt rõõmsamaks ja ütles "Ma tean, ma olen selle läbi lugenud". Minu esimene mõte oli, et mis ta blufib, naguinii ei ole. Minu küsiva pilgu peale aga seletas, "minu õde on psühhiaater, tema uurib kurjategijaid, tema andis". Siis läks mul pilt paika. Jim Cramer on täiuslik õpikunäide maniakaalsest inimesest. Ja maniakaalsed on tüüpilised geeniused ja/või kurjategijad.

    abesiki vist kuskil kirjutas, et läbi löönutel inimestel on olemas idee ja "kiiks". Crameri oma on ainuüksi raamatute pealt näha. Mis muidugi ei vähenda tema asjalikkust :). Aga huvitav fakt iseenesest et psühhiaatrid sama raamatut õpikuna kasutavad teemal "selline on teie patsient" kust kauplejad endale vaimujõudu ammutamas käivad.
  • • This could be the big down day we have been expecting in this triple-witching week.
    • It's a chance to buy stocks at lower levels than you ordinarily would have.
  • Artikkel Cramer'i kohta:
    http://www.cxoadvisory.com/blog/reviews/blog6-29-05/
  • Olen ka ise uks Cramerica elanik ja jarjest rohkem hakkab elu sellel maal meeldima:)
    Kannatust voiks teinekord ainult natuke rohkem olla...sest Cramerica elanikke on palju ja iive suur, taksojuhid voidavad iga kell fondijuhte:)

    Booya, Jimbo!
  • Spunk, vaatad saadet ja mängid pickide peale?
  • Kristjan, kui vahegi voimalik, vaatan saadet.
    Ja toesti, saade on vaatamist vaart, ka finantsilises mottes.
    Naiteks tema kaesoleva nadala picki - TEX - tegin kaasa. Ostsin seda veel reedel enne turu loppu $48.5 pealt, saate ajal muusin maha 49.33, kuid...praegu on hind ule $51!

    Mida rohkem populaarsemaks saade muutub, seda kergem on raha teha...aga koik see kestab mingi teatud kriitilise punktini.

    Igaljuhul praegu katsun enne saadet possu sisse votta, sel juhul on kasum kindel.
    Ka saate ajal voetud possud on kiire tegutsemise korral alati kasumit toonud, aga eelistan siiski enne saadet positsioone votta.
  • Ja mul oli muideks täpselt sama küsimus! Kas ehk Crameri subscriberina nt Realmoney's, kus Cramer annab teada enne tehingut?
  • Ei saa Crameri subscriberina.
    Teised allikad.
  • Paradise and Money Lost

    ON Feb. 24, Ronald S. Kochman hurried out of the elevator onto the 17th floor of an office tower in West Palm Beach, Fla., that KL Group, a hedge fund advisory firm, called home. Normally bustling with activity, the place was eerily quiet that morning as Mr. Kochman strode past the elegant conference rooms toward his destination: the corner office of Won Sok Lee, one of the firm's principals.

    Skip to next paragraph

    Won Sok Lee, left, and John Kim are accused of a huge hedge fund fraud that hurt investors in the Palm Beach, Fla., area. Mr. Kim is helping prosecutors; Mr. Lee has fled.


    At a Palm Beach restaurant in January, Won Lee, second from left, dined next to George Schneider, KL Group's marketing director; Ronald S. Kochman, an investor and lawyer who became a principal; and John Kim, another principal. The men on the far left and far right sides of the group are not identified. Within two months, KL Group would be shut down.
    Two days earlier, Securities and Exchange Commission officials had unexpectedly visited KL's offices, demanding to see documents. Now some employees were reporting that Mr. Lee was missing - along with nearly all the money in the firm's accounts.

    Mr. Kochman, a prominent trust and estate lawyer in the Palm Beach area, had much to lose. Not only had he sunk his savings, about $4 million, into the funds, but he had also put his reputation on the line by urging his own clients to invest with KL, where he had become a principal early last year. So when someone with keys to Mr. Lee's office asked him why he wanted to go in that morning, a tearful Mr. Kochman collapsed on his knees and said, "It's gone. It's all gone," according to a person who witnessed the event. "The money is missing and Won has jumped ship."

    Today, the S.E.C., the Justice Department and a court-appointed receiver are still trying to unravel what happened. Investigators now say they believe that more than $200 million of investors' money has vanished, possibly making this one of the largest hedge fund frauds ever. In March, the S.E.C. sued Mr. Lee and two brothers, John and Yung Bae Kim, accusing them of securities fraud.

    While the funds' managers blinded investors with records showing supposedly dazzling returns, the money was actually being frittered away in bad trades or simply stolen, according to the court-appointed receiver, the law firm Lewis Tein. Mr. Lee and Yung Kim have disappeared, and John Kim, who is cooperating with the investigation, denies any knowledge of wrongdoing.

    "These guys were slick. They would have given Barnum & Bailey a run for their money," said Guy A. Lewis, a partner at Lewis Tein and a former United States attorney for the Southern District of Florida who, in the early 1990's, helped to prosecute Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega of Panama. "This wasn't just a straight fraud. It was hocus-pocus, smoke and mirrors."

    THIS much is known: Three years ago, Mr. Lee and the Kim brothers opened a hedge fund advisory business in Palm Beach, one of the nation's wealthiest enclaves. Driving flashy cars and living lavish lifestyles, the three principals - all Korean-born Americans in their mid-30's - befriended the right people, who provided them with access to society functions and introductions to their wealthy clients.

    The aura of success and exclusivity around the firm was so strong that investors often begged to be let into its funds, some of which were said to have astounding annualized returns of 125 percent for several years. Among the funds' 225 investors were some of Palm Beach's elite, including Jerome Fisher, the founder of the Nine West shoe store chain; Carlos Morrison, an heir to the Fisher Body automotive fortune; and golf pros Nick Price and Raymond Floyd, according to people who have seen lists of investors.

    While Palm Beach is still abuzz about the collapse of KL, few investors want to acknowledge that they were caught up in the frenzy. Donald J. Trump, who owns several properties in the area, said in an interview that he had been contacted about investing in the fund but didn't because he thought the returns were too good to be true. "These guys duped a lot of people down in Palm Beach, smart people with lots of money," Mr. Trump said. "These people feel they were conned, and they're embarrassed. They just don't want to talk about it."

    The investigation has been hampered by a web of more than 30 domestic bank accounts - and more overseas - where money was moved around quickly. Individual, hedge fund and proprietary trading accounts were intermingled at the firm, and false bank statements were rampant, according to the receiver.

    "There has been a tremendous amount of money lost," said Scott A. Masel, the S.E.C.'s head counsel in Miami investigating KL. "We might be looking at something akin to a Ponzi scheme, but the records make it difficult to pin down exactly what happened here."

    What's clear is that scores of well-heeled investors missed signs that things were not quite right at KL. It turns out, for example, that the fund's principals had little experience in the securities industry. And there was never a formal independent audit to verify whether the remarkable returns reported by the funds were real.

    "Even if the guy running the hedge fund has a sterling 20-year reputation on Wall Street, a sophisticated investor who's going to put $20 million in that fund wants to see those safeguards in place," said Lewis N. Brown, the counsel for a Palm Beach accounting firm that performed some accounting services for one of the smaller KL hedge funds. "That didn't happen here."

    THE story of KL starts in a San Francisco apartment in the late 1990's, where John Kim and Mr. Lee were caught up in a major fad: day-trading of technology stocks. From what can be pieced together about their background through public records and interviews with former colleagues, the two had virtually no experience trading stocks. (Calls to Mr. Kim's lawyers were not returned. Yung Kim and Mr. Lee could not be reached.)

    Mr. Lee grew up in Las Vegas - where his father now works as a marketing executive at the Bellagio Hotel and Casino - and earned a law degree at Tulane University in 1996. He worked as an associate in the gambling department at a Las Vegas law firm, and, in the late 1990's, in the tax department at a San Diego law firm.

    John Kim and Yung Kim grew up in a Virginia suburb of Washington. John, who is also known as Jung Kim and is the older of the two, told colleagues that he had graduated from George Washington University and then operated a coffee importing business in South Korea, but that the government took it away and deported him because it was so successful.

    Mr. Kim bragged to others that he had a vast Wall Street background, often evoking his time in the mergers and acquisitions department at Merrill Lynch, according to former colleagues. (Merrill Lynch said it had no records that Mr. Kim had ever worked there.) The NASD, a regulator that licenses securities professionals, says it has no records that any of the firm's original three principals had the necessary licenses to trade stocks for clients, which a Wall Street brokerage firm would require. Such licenses, however, are not needed to run a hedge fund.

    Whatever their credentials, Mr. Kim and Mr. Lee rode the tech boom, reporting strong returns to friends and associates. Soon they began attracting outside investors. Eventually, they moved their operation to an office in Irvine, Calif., where they hired a number of young, fairly inexperienced people to trade the principals' own money, or proprietary accounts, while Mr. Kim focused on trading clients' and hedge fund assets. Mr. Lee handled back-office duties and Yung Kim served as the firm's chief financial officer.

    In August 2002, John Kim and a childhood friend, Rob Melley, decided to open an East Coast branch of KL in the Palm Beach area. But within a couple of months, the two friends had a falling-out after Mr. Kim became frustrated over what he felt was the slow pace of the Palm Beach expansion, according to a former employee who did not want to be identified because of continuing investigations.

    Mr. Melley walked away from the venture, although his father, James, who was also very close to Mr. Kim, remained a KL investor, according to the former employee. Calls to Rob Melley's residence and to James Melley's lawyers were not returned. Through James Melley, Mr. Kim and his partners met the man who would play a crucial role in giving them entry to the Palm Beach scene: Ronald Kochman.

    Since the late 1990's, Mr. Kochman had built a lucrative trusts-and-estates practice, counting a number of Palm Beach's movers and shakers as clients. "Kochman had one of the pre-eminent practices down here," said Richard Rampell, an accountant who worked with Mr. Kochman on several occasions. "In the last couple of years, he probated two estates that were well into nine or even 10 figures. He was the envy of a lot of lawyers."

    Mr. Kochman would not comment for this article. According to investigators and KL employees, Mr. Kochman became increasingly involved with the firm and formed a close friendship with Mr. Kim, who made him one of its principals. Mr. Kochman, these people said, believed that there were greater riches to be reaped if KL were sold to a large Wall Street firm, as Mr. Kim indicated it eventually would be. They said Mr. Kochman planned to downsize his trusts-and-estates business in order to play an even bigger role at KL.

    Trusting his new friends, Mr. Kochman provided introductions to his clients and friends and was responsible for bringing in many of KL's investors, according to investigators.

    His role has now become a focal point among investigators and lawyers representing some of the clients that he put into the fund. Gary Klein, a former S.E.C. branch chief whose firm, Klein & Sallah, represents 65 investors who lost at least $90 million in KL, said that a number of them were also clients of Mr. Kochman's law practice. "That was clearly a breach of fiduciary duty if Kochman was a principal at KL and didn't disclose it," Mr. Klein said.

    Mr. Kochman's lawyer would not comment on whether his client had recommended his own clients to the fund. "I think Mr. Kochman believed that there might be a future for him" at KL, said his lawyer, Morris Weinberg Jr. "This looked like a wonderful opportunity that, obviously, didn't work out."

    NOT that it was all that difficult for KL to persuade investors to jump into the funds with both feet. Its main fund reported strong returns of 70 percent in 2003 and 40 percent in 2004, according to statements given to investors. The lifestyle of the funds' original three principals also supported the picture of a business doing well. The young men drove flashy cars: Maseratis, Porsche 911's and Mercedes SL 500's. (The firm's personal masseuse drove a Jaguar X-Type that was provided by KL.) End-of-year holiday parties were held in Las Vegas, where Mr. Kim and Mr. Lee were high-rolling VIP's at several casinos.

    The crown jewel was KL's luxurious offices in the new Esperante building in downtown West Palm Beach. The large sunlit offices were filled with gorgeous desks designed by Dakota Jackson and a conference table that had to be hoisted 17 floors through the building's elevator shaft. Some walls were covered in a gray suede fabric, and in the corner of Mr. Kim's office was a $6,000 massage chair. The trading floor had large flat-panel televisions scattered throughout.

    It all was a great way to impress clients, who were ushered in to watch the main attraction: Mr. Kim. From his captain's chair, he traded frenetically, surrounded by 20 computer screens.

    But like so many things at KL, not all was what it seemed. There were, for instance, the many faces of Mr. Kim himself. To KL's investors, he was charismatic and respectful. Several older men who invested in the fund are said by former employees to have treated him like a son. Inside KL, though, Mr. Kim's moods swung sharply. At times, he was extremely patient and friendly with the young traders, going to their homes for poker games. Some employees, however, describe Mr. Kim as an egotistical bully who would have fits of rage.

    And Mr. Kim may not have been as successful an investor as he wanted people to believe. In fact, a former KL trader said that Mr. Kim did not make any money at all in his trading activities. In KL offering letters, Mr. Kim claimed to have developed a proprietary technical analysis system called "SmartCharts" that involved short-selling stocks that were making highs in the market - betting that those stocks would lose value.

    "Essentially, John was constantly trading against the trend," recalled the trader, who also did not want to be identified because of his involvement in continuing regulatory investigations. "The strongest stocks in the fall of 2004 were stocks he was selling short." Those shorted stocks included those of eBay, Yahoo and Research in Motion, the maker of the BlackBerry wireless device, this trader said.


    The trader said Mr. Kim often traded ahead of a company's quarterly earnings report - a bet on whether the company would miss, meet or beat Wall Street's expectations.

    The firm's proprietary traders weren't faring very well, either. A majority of the young, inexperienced traders were not making enough money from their bets in the market to earn a commission. Instead, they were receiving a $1,500 draw each month that they were expected to pay back, according to the receiver.

    Based on the receiver's investigation so far, it appears that any trading profits the firm recorded during 2003 or 2004 were promptly stolen by the defendants in the securities fraud case, according to Michael R. Tein, a former federal prosecutor who is now a partner at Lewis Tein. As losses mounted late last year, the house of cards holding up KL began to collapse.

    Last fall, a number of investors started to clamor for an independent audit of KL's funds. "We told them, 'We have to have audits done on this thing,' " said a person who invested in one of KL's funds in early 2004 but did not want to be identified because he did not want to be associated with the scandal. "They kept promising they would do it, but kept putting it off." The investor said he was even offered "big incentives" in a meeting late last year with John Kim and Mr. Kochman to bring in new investors. "I told them when you give me a confirmed, certified audit, I'll consider doing something for you," the investor said.

    Certain investors who were receiving daily and weekly updates on the performance of KL's funds realized that they were starting to lose money. Between the losses and the lack of a certified audit, at least two large KL investors filled out withdrawal slips so that they could remove about $10 million from the funds by the end of the year, according to a former employee.

    Fearing that investors would redeem more money from the funds - money the funds may not have had, according to investigators - the firm's principals raced to stop the outflows. One of their biggest investors who was ready to bolt late last year was a local eye surgeon, Dr. Salomon E. Melgen.

    By last fall, Dr. Melgen intended to withdraw some of the $12.3 million investment that he and a holding company he controlled had already given to John Kim to manage, according to a lawsuit he filed against the advisory firm and its principals. (Mr. Melgen's lawyer said he would not comment for this article.) Instead, in October, John Kim and Mr. Lee signed a document that guaranteed that Dr. Melgen's $12.3 million would be repaid at the end of January 2005, according to the document. The money was to be set aside in a separate account and traded only by John Kim.

    Dr. Melgen had invested an additional $7 million in one of KL's funds and put $1 million in a separate account under an agreement that would allow Mr. Kim to use an airplane owned by Dr. Melgen. Within four months of Dr. Melgen's receiving the signed guarantee, his $20 million investment had disappeared, according to the lawsuit.

    In late February, regulators from the S.E.C. entered KL's California and Palm Beach offices simultaneously, demanding to see documents. Mr. Kim avoided the regulators in West Palm Beach, saying he couldn't be bothered during trading hours, a former employee said. In California, though, regulators met with both Mr. Lee and Yung Kim, S.E.C. documents show. After the meeting, investigators said, Mr. Lee walked out of the office, leaving a half-eaten bag of cookies on his desk. The next morning he went to the airport and bought a one-way ticket for South Korea, using frequent-flier miles, the investigators said. The day after that, Yung Kim disappeared as well.

    A few days after the S.E.C. appeared on KL's doorstep, John Kim invited about 30 employees to his home. As the employees listened in shock, he said that the company was under investigation and that his brother and Mr. Lee were missing. He said nothing about missing funds. "John put his arms around me, apologized profusely about what was happening and told me he didn't know anything," said Al Farinelli, the firm's controller. "He said his brother was responsible for everything."

    John Kim's assets have been frozen by the S.E.C., but he agreed to cooperate with investigators in exchange for being granted access to enough money to pay for eye surgery for his young daughter earlier this year, according to the S.E.C.

    Mr. Kim has said that, based on his knowledge of his own trading activity, the hedge fund was profitable, according to testimony he provided to regulators in March. If losses did occur, he said, he had no idea whether they were a result of trading screens that had been doctored, or if Mr. Lee and Yung Kim had lost any profits in their own trading activities.

    Some KL investors say they believe him. "I think John Kim is a victim in all of this. So is Ron Kochman," said a female investor who didn't want to be identified but who was friendly with Mr. Kim and his family as well as with Mr. Lee. When asked if she held Mr. Kim responsible for losses she incurred, the investor said, "I'm the only one responsible for deciding to be in the fund." LAWYERS at Lewis Tein said they had fielded calls from investors who were eager to give Mr. Kim money again because they believed he could make it back for them.

    But several people who once called Mr. Kim a friend said they are skeptical of Mr. Kim's claims. "We're reviewing documents, e-mails and trading records and some of what we've seen so far may not support Mr. Kim's position," said David B. Rosemberg, a lawyer at Lewis Tein. Other people said they were bothered by a last-minute trip that Mr. Kim made to South Korea in December, when he bought a $650,000 home in Seoul.

    Furthermore, the S.E.C. said this spring that at least $20 million of investor funds were diverted for the personal use of KL's principals, including Mr. Kim. Investigators said they believe that the fancy cars and even some of Mr. Kim's mortgage payments came directly from KL's coffers.

    Will the whole story of KL ever be known? Investigators are poring over documents and statements, trying to put together what happened, but that will take months, and even then a clear picture may not emerge. As for the millions lost by investors, it is unlikely that much will be recouped, according to lawyers involved in the case.

    But people searching for a bigger lesson from the story of KL might find it in a sign at the firm's opulent West Palm Beach offices. It lists KL's 36 trading principles. No. 26? Greed kills.


    http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/14/business/yourmoney/14hedge.html?pagewanted=all
  • Börsipäeva jutulõimede algusesse kopeeritava Rev Sharki nimesaamislugu :)

    How I Became Rev Shark
    8/26/2005 11:37 AM EDT
    A reader asks how I ended up with the nickname Rev Shark. At the risk of sounding a little too self-involved, I'll tell the story. In the early days of the Internet, the online services did not require members to pick a screen name. They were uncreative and assigned to you.

    When AOL started, you were able to choose a default name like James32483 or devise your own name. As a former attorney and an aggressive trader, "Shark" certainly seemed appropriate.

    At the time, I also was engaged in an ongoing debate with the folks who called themselves the Motley Fool. They first appeared on the old Prodigy service in about 1996 or so and greatly irritated me with their "our way is the only way" attitude about the stock market.

    They preached a long-term strategy but applied it to stocks that seemed unworthy of a Buffettesque commitment. Furthermore, they had no apparent selling strategy and had no qualms about belittling those who chose a different path.

    As I've written here many times, I strongly believe there are many ways to conquer the market beast. The best approach depends to a great degree on your personal situation. Despite this seemingly obvious fact, the Motley Fool persisted in its diatribes against technical analysis, active trading, small-cap stocks, options and anything that wasn't included in its gospel of investing.

    That misguided message was the impetus for my mission to "save souls from the dangers of buy and hold." My message was that there is more than one form of investing religion that will lead to salvation. In fact, "buy and hold" investing often presented temptations that lead to investing hell. I believed, and still believe, that active trading and good money management with the help of chart-reading can be far less risky and more lucrative than long-term buy-and-hold investing.

    Because of the zeal with which I was willing to spread my form of investing religion, the designation "Reverend" seemed appropriate. Hence the nickname.

    The market is starting to stabilize as Dr. Greenspan's comments are digested, but breadth is poor, small-cap stocks weak and the action choppy.
  • December 3, 1999
    Deals & Deal Makers
    Day Trader Profits
    For Over 20 Years
    By MITCHELL PACELLE and CHARLES GASPARINO
    Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL



    You may not know him, but Wall Street does -- he is one of the
    original day traders.

    Steven Cohen began rapid-fire trading as an amateur in the 1970s, 20
    years before terms such as "day trader" and "chat room" entered the
    financial lexicon. In high school, he hung around a brokerage-firm
    branch in Great Neck, N.Y., studying stocks and dreaming up trades. In
    college, he learned to "trade the tape" before computer screens were
    the norm.

    Such in-and-out trading has spelled financial ruin for many day
    traders. Some 70% of day-trading customers lose money, one study says.

    But for Mr. Cohen, the trigger-happy investment style has made him
    millions of dollars, in up markets and down, year in and year out.
    Now, seven years after forming SAC Capital Management, the secretive
    trader has become one of the most sought-after managers in the
    hedge-fund world.

    Mr. Cohen's success shows just how profitable quick-finger trading can
    be, at least for those with extensive experience and ties to Wall
    Street, and the help of a staff of 90 trading investment
    professionals. Mr. Cohen, 43 years old, has become one of Wall
    Street's biggest, and most coveted, customers, allowing him to build
    an enviable information network.

    Getting in and uut quickly is his trademark. "Steve is the single-most
    successful practitioner of this style that there is -- bar none," says
    John Troubh, who worked with him at Gruntal & Co. and now runs his own
    hedge fund.
    "Maybe he doesn't capture the first 10% or the last 10%
    [of a stock's move], but he gets the juiciest 80% that gives him the
    speed."

    But he doesn't come cheap. Mr. Cohen charges investors in his flagship
    fund about 45% of the profits, more than double the 20% charged by
    most hedge-fund managers. His Stamford, Conn., firm, which is
    currently closed to new investors, manages about $1.6 billion, putting
    him firmly in the hedge-fund major leagues. His flagship fund has
    soared 68% this year through November, after fees, far surpassing the
    broader market and the average hedge fund. This followed a 49% gain
    last year, during the most dismal hedge-fund year in memory, when the
    average hedge fund was flat. SAC has posted double-digit gains every
    year since it was formed.

    And he has had plenty of losing trades. "My best trader makes money
    only 63% of the time," he conceded in an April speech. "Most traders
    make money only 50% to 55% of the time. The margin of success is
    small."


    On Wednesday, for example, SAC bought McDonald's Corp. shares in the
    wake of the fast-food company's agreement to purchase Boston Chicken
    Inc., according to one person familiar with the trade. SAC's
    expectation of a quick stock pop was dashed Thursday morning, when
    Banc of America downgraded the stock, triggering a price drop. SAC
    quickly dumped part of its stake at a loss (though it later bought
    some more shares).

    Strictly speaking, Mr. Cohen isn't a day trader, because he often
    holds securities overnight. But he typically holds stocks for hours,
    days or weeks, not months. A list of SAC's 10 largest stock holdings
    on June 30 shares only one name with the March 31 list -- which in
    turn shares only one with the Dec. 31 list, according to data compiled
    by Carson Group. By contrast, Julian Robertson's Tiger Management,
    which manages more than five times as much money, had five of the same
    stocks on its July list of top 10 stock holdings as it did in
    February.

    "I'll tell you what we do at SAC," Mr. Cohen explained in the April
    speech. "We trade. A lot. Over 20 million shares a day. A broker's
    dream come true. We trade fast. ... It's not growth investing. It's
    not value investing. It's short-term catalyst investing."

    A spokesman for the fund declined to comment on the portfolio or its
    performance. Mr. Cohen has built his positions not by focusing solely
    on stocks' long-term fundamentals. Rather, he carefully scrutinizes
    stocks' price and volume moves, tries to figure out why -- then
    quickly pulls the trigger, say those who have worked with him.

    In August, for instance, Mr. Cohen saw that Microsoft Corp. shares
    were getting hammered. He learned there was a window in which some
    Microsoft insiders could sell stock. He watched the stock fall through
    mid-August, then bought at $83.50, according to someone familiar with
    the trades. Within a week, as the insider selling subsided, the stock
    was back up at $89. Mr. Cohen sold.

    "He's unbelievable at determining when to buy or sell based on when
    other people stop buying or selling," says Steven Heinemann, a partner
    at First New York Securities, a trading firm, who used to work with
    Mr. Cohen on Wall Street and at SAC.

    Mr. Cohen doesn't trade blind. Rather, he makes educated guesses about
    when stocks will move, or stop moving. When talk of a restructuring at
    Bausch & Lomb Inc. began circulating weeks ago, SAC bought in while
    the stock was in the mid-$50 range. On Wednesday, when the
    restructuring was announced, the stock leapt more than $4 to close at
    $59, and it was up another $6.75 yesterday, in New York Stock Exchange
    4 p.m. trading. Earlier yesterday, Mr. Cohen sold about 60% of the
    fund's stake, a person familiar with the transaction said.

    Mr. Cohen got an early start studying the market. "He was reading The
    [Wall Street] Journal from when he was 11," recalls Ronald Aizer, a
    neighborhood friend. When Mr. Cohen went to college, he talked Mr.
    Aizer, who was then running the arbitrage department at Gruntal, into
    handling his trades.

    "Some guys liked to play intramural football," says Jay Goldman, a
    college chum who later worked with Mr. Cohen and now is an investor in
    his fund. "Steve liked to go down and trade."

    Mr. Aizer hired Mr. Cohen in 1978, after his graduation from the
    University of Pennsylvania, to join his options arbitrage department
    at Gruntal. "I wouldn't be surprised if he made close to $1 million
    trading the first year," says Mr. Aizer.

    After a half-dozen years, Mr. Cohen set up his own trading group at
    Gruntal, which Mr. Goldman says was "by far the most successful" of
    Gruntal's trading groups. But eventually, like many successful Wall
    Street traders, Mr. Cohen hungered to run his own show. He set up SAC
    in 1992.

    Success came quickly. Investors gained 50% in 1993, after fees, and
    25% the following year. In the hedge-fund world, success begets
    growth. SAC's money under management has ballooned in five years more
    than 80-fold from $20 million. (Indeed, at year end Mr. Cohen expects
    to pare the fund to a more manageable $1.3 billion.)

    Mr. Cohen's rapid-fire trading style can't handle that much capital.
    So several years ago, he started hiring more traders and analysts,
    spreading investors' capital among them, and edging toward a more
    long-term investing style. He divides new investors' capital between
    the pool he manages, which continues to go for quick hits, and such
    strategies as event-driven value, quantitative futures, electric
    utilities stocks, merger arbitrage and health care. He keeps 50% of
    profits on his pool, about half that on the others.

    Mr. Cohen aims to drill his traders in what he has called "the SAC
    way." Ari Kiev, a psychiatrist, visits the firm several times a week
    to act as a trading coach. "All traders have traits that hold them
    back," Mr. Cohen explained in a speech. "Traders have to face their
    demons. Bad traders blame the market or bad luck. It's neither. It's
    just bad habits."


    Dr. Kiev worked in the 1970s with Olympic athletes on maximizing
    performance. Periodically, SAC traders meet with him as a group, and
    in front of their peers, set profit targets for themselves. And Dr.
    Kiev, after studying the win/loss ratios of individual traders, meets
    with traders individually to hash out such problems as holding losing
    positions too long.

    That is an important corollary of Mr. Cohen's approach-don't fall in
    love with your ideas. Says Mr. Troubh: "I've seen him plow into stocks
    and say within a few minutes, 'Geez, this is stupid.' He'll sell."

  • Cramer kirjutab, et seoses Katrina põhjustatud kriisiga (mida ilmestavad mööda orkaani poolt rüüstatud asulaid ujuvad allligaatorid, haid ja marodöörid) on FED intressidetõstmise tsükkel lõppenud. See annab ka selgituse üllatavalt tugevale aktsiaturule ja kiirelt nõrgenenud dollarile.
  • Tahtsin peale head promo tellida Amazonist raamatu Trading with The Enemy, kuid selgus, et selle saadavus on hetkel suht olematu või siis hirmsa kirvega kasutatud eksemplare.... Ega LHV oma klientidele väikest raamatukoguteenust ei osuta? Äkki saaks kaubale? Bettie? Kristjan?
  • Värske lugu Cramerist BusinessWeekis

    http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_44/b3957001.htm
  • siin üks hea näide kuidas Cramer'i ütlemised turgu mõjutavad
    JDSU eile ja täna

    tehnika mehed läheks vast pikaks kui murrab ja jääb 2.45st peale,
    käive tõotab tulla keskmisest suurem
  • carlos, link ei läinud nagu eriti aktiivseks :-(
  • ei olnudki linki

    http://www.thestreet.com/_yahoo/funds/smarter_up/10254164.html?cm_ven=YAHOO&cm_cat=FREE&cm_ite=NA

    läbi finance.yahoo.com leiab ilusti
  • lemming: ei pannud enne seda postitust tähele. Aga kui endiselt raamatut tahad siis 50 41 396 mulle traati ja ma annan.

  • Allpool ühe konkurendi värvikas arvamus Jim Crameri kohta.
    Kes ei viitsi artiklit läbi lugeda, siis teeksin omalt poolt väga subjektiivse lühikokkuvõtte: vaadake tema show'd kindlasti, kuid suhtuge sellesse kui Ameerika turule suunatud tsirkusesse, investeerimisotsused aga tehke ratsionaalsete argumentide põhjal.
    (So, by all means, keep watching Cramer. I know I will. For new stock ideas, I find some of his introductions to be invaluable, as long as I roll up my sleeves and follow it up with due diligence.)

    Aga jah, olen nõus, et Crameri väljaütlemised mõjutavad turgu oluliselt ja kauplejate jaoks on see tähtis!


    Artikkel:


    Cramer vs. Cramer
    By Rick Aristotle Munarriz (TMFBreakerRick)
    January 9, 2006

    You've got to love Jim Cramer. The colorful founder of TheStreet.com (Nasdaq: TSCM), who has become one of the more memorable CNBC personalities (perhaps the most memorable), pulls off a daily market-munching show that few stock gurus would dare to attempt. He rants about business and investing during Mad Money, culminating in the always-entertaining, Wall Street-on-steroids, lightning round segment. Armed with sound effects and one-line zingers, Cramer takes on a rat-a-tat army of callers who heave stocks and ticker symbols his way to hear his knee-jerk reaction.

    As with most market mavens, there comes a time when educators become entertainers. It's during these speed rounds that Cramer pawns substance to load up on style points. Cramer is a brilliant man. His ability to have something to say on just about every name that is fired his way is commendable. It's a hoot to watch sometimes. My problem, though, is that there are some folks who take that entertaining segment and consume it as something serious. They take that little seven-word nugget and blast it on speculative stock discussion boards as if it's due diligence (at best) or gospel (at worst).

    I worry about these people. I do. They're the ones who take fortune cookies seriously. They're the type that can fathom a haiku as a business plan. Investing isn't very complicated, but it's not that easy.

    Leading by example
    Fancy him or loathe him, Cramer is a genius. As a trader, Cramer's opinion on certain companies is bound to fluctuate, often within a day or two. Someone who rushes to their broker with a new mandate based on a bull or bear sound effect button being triggered frightens me. Cramer has every right to speak his mind -- and change it -- but when some poor sap trades in and out of a particular company without seriously considering the implications, it's troublesome.

    Yes, there are implications. From short-term capital gains to wash sale rules to the trading costs involved in bid-ask spreads and broker commissions, buying in and out of the same company can be hazardous to your investing health.

    Mike from California, one of the subscribers to our Rule Breakers newsletter service, was kind enough to dig into Cramer's back-and-forth tugs on a company by the name of Intuitive Surgical (Nasdaq: ISRG), a newsletter recommendation.

    He went through the Mad Money archives over the last six months to dig up Cramer's changing stance on the intriguing and fast-growing maker of surgically savvy robotic arms that keep popping up in operating rooms everywhere. In that time alone, Cramer went through seven different trading recommendations on the company. Let's dig in.

    Intuitive intuition
    On July 26, 2005, Cramer interviewed Aleks Cukic, Intuitive Surgical's vice president of business development and strategic planning, on the show. The company had just announced blowout earnings, and Cramer was convinced. "Intuitive Surgical is a winner," Cramer said. The stock went on to open at $63.16 the next day.

    Two days after issuing the buy, Cramer had senior MarketWatch columnist Herb Greenberg on the show. Greenberg was cautious, picking out risks in owning Intuitive Surgical, and Cramer agreed. According to the recap, "Cramer said it would be silly for investors who have big gains to not ring the register after such a big move in the stock." The next day the stock opened at $69.21.

    A 9.6% gain in two days is nothing to scoff at. The problem is that if that trade was done in a taxable account, triggering short-term capital gains would have cut into more than a third of those returns.

    Cramer regained his bullish tone on Sept. 6. "I think the great quarters are going to continue," he told the caller. The stock opened the next day at $69.38. Yes, you have to give Cramer props in that the company didn't do much while he was away, though buying in a few pennies higher than after his July warning also came with the extra costs of two broker trades to step out and step back in.

    The September call was a juicy one. Two months later, he issued a colorful kiss-off. "You should ring the register," he said on Nov. 9. "Didn't you ever take that astronomy course that tells you how high you are?" The stock opened at $95.70 the next day, so one would think that a 38% gain in two months wouldn't leave too many investors smarting.

    However, just five days later, with the stock in triple digits, he grabbed the company by its bullish horns. He once again had Cukic on the show, and it's amazing what three trading days can do for one's disposition.

    "You don't get in the way of these monsters when they're rolling," he said on Nov. 14. "This stock goes higher because they're nowhere near saturation. I think it's still two thumbs up for ISRG."

    The stock opened at $105.50, angering the astronomy students who had taken his advice a few days earlier and bailed in the double digits.

    On Dec. 13, pointing out that the stock had tripled since the beginning of the year, Cramer remained bullish. "You're in the House of Pleasure," he said. "Ride that stock another 10 points." The stock opened at $118.89 after the show.

    Did he wait for those 10 points? No way. "I now want to ring the register," he said on Jan. 5, 2006, lumping the company together with Syneron Medical (Nasdaq: ELOS) on his sell call. "I think ISRG has overstayed its welcome on the 52-week-high list." The stock opened the next day at $117.73. It wasn't necessarily a fair comparison, because Syneron had just warned that it would miss its 2005 revenue target.

    Date Recommendation Opening Price
    7-26-05 Buy $63.16
    7-28-05 Sell $69.21
    9-6-05 Buy $69.38
    11-9-05 Sell $95.70
    11-14-05 Buy $105.50
    12-13-05 Hold $118.89
    1-5-06 Sell $117.73


    But of course, there's always my way
    Intuitive Surgical is a pretty amazing company. More installations. The da Vinci robotic arms in place are being used more often, providing the company with even more recurring revenue. Wall Street's missed the boat. Through the first three quarters of 2005, the company beat estimates by an average of 71%. Yes, 71%.

    Before those three quarters of gargantuan market-thumping action, the stock was singled out to Rule Breakers newsletter subscribers. In March 2005, it was recommended at $44.17. There was no waffling in and out. There were no astronomy lessons or stampeding bull graphics. It was just a thoroughly researched buy report. In fact, David Gardner was so impressed with the stock that he issued a re-recommendation six months later, even though the stock was up to $69.68 then.

    CNBC addicts who followed Cramer's advice on Intuitive Surgical every step of the way over the last six months may feel richly rewarded. Despite the trading costs, missed gaps, taxable short-term gains and tax-filing hassles, they would have come out ahead. The three round-trip trades would have resulted in a 59% overall gain, reduced to a still respectable sub-40% after the taxman's cut. That's without accounting for the various charges involved due to weaving in and out of the shares. One can't dismiss those nibbles. It could be substantial, especially for smaller investors. Still, it seems like a pretty enriching string of trades on the surface.

    However, that's no match for buying in at the mid-$40s 10 months ago -- or close to $70 just four months ago -- and riding it up to the triple digits the easy way.

    Buy and hold may be a boring mantra, but it works even for volatile growth stocks. Some of David's biggest gains when he was running the real-money Rule Breaker portfolio through the 1990s came from holding on to stocks like Amazon.com (Nasdaq: AMZN), eBay (Nasdaq: EBAY), and Amgen (Nasdaq: AMGN) through their daily gyrations.

    Intuitive Surgical has served subscribers well -- up a whopping 178% since the March recommendation -- but it's not even the biggest winner in the service. Two months earlier, Vertex Pharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: VRTX) was singled out at $10.48 and has gone on to nearly triple.

    It's part of the reason why the 32 stocks that have made the cut in the ultimate growth newsletter service have performed so well. The average pick is up 24%, while the market has advanced by an average of just 7% over that time.


  • Värvika isiksuse Crameri kohta on kostunud vahepeal mitmest nurgast seisukohti, a la:

    "I wish someone would hospitalize Jim Cramer"
    "Never listen to him and would do the opposite of anything he says"

    Kus siis on piir investeerimise, nõustamise ja show vahel?
    Päris huvitav!
  • Hiljuti tampis tehnoloogiat ja kiitis Amgen-i. Täna risti vastupidine, teh tõusus, Amgen languses.
  • Päris huvitav intervjuu Crameriga sellest, kuidas turuga manipuleeritakse.

    Siin...

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