LHV finantsportaal

Foorum Investeerimine

Börsipäev 23. september

Kommentaari jätmiseks loo konto või logi sisse

  • Statistikute rõõmuks tähistas eilne päev mitme rekordi purustamist, seega on, mida mäletada:

    Dow Jonesi indeks liikus neljandat päeva järjest vähemalt 350 punkti, seda ei ole varem juhtunud.
    Naftabarreli hind tõusis $16.37 võrra $120.92-ni, mis on ajaloo suurim tõus (pigem tehnilist laadi).
    Dollar kukkus euro vastu 2.5%, mis on dollari suurim protsentuaalne langus euro loomisest alates.

    Huvitavad ajad.
  • 1) Futuurikauplejad kas suplevad rahas või enam ei kauple.
    2) Nafta+dollar - mängime veel üks kord inflatsioonilist keskkonda (mis siis, et kinnisvara- ja krediidikriis on olemuselt deflatsioonilised)
    3) EUR/USD - mnjaa - eksisteerib siiski mingi vahe, kas bailout'i tehakse raha trükkimise või täiendava võla teel.
  • 1) Rahas suplevad vist vähesed, turg on üsna prognoosimatu.
    2) Kuigi kriis ise on deflatsiooniline, siis $700B on päris suur summa. :)

    Karum6mm, mis sa viimase kohta arvad? Usun, et kangesti tahetakse trükkimise teed minna, aga ilma võlakoorma kasvuta ei petaks vist kedagi ära... Samas see sinu poolt viidatud vahe väga suur ei ole (kahest halvast üks on natuke parem lihtsalt).
  • Üks põhjusi miks commodity on nii alla pekstud: probleemid finantsis sunnivad kasumlikke positsioone mujal sulgema. New Wall Street model may curb commodity flows
  • momentum minuarust tooraine naca ylehinnatud ka ju.
  • Esialgsete kuulduste järgi EL riigid pankadel pead silitama ei hakka ja USA-sarnaseid päästeoperatsioone ei korralda. See peaks siis USD kurssi euro suhtes veelgi nõrgemaks muutma ja peaksime nägema ka kõrgemat nafta hinda.
  • Oskab keegi öelda, milline on EUR/USD piir, kus EL riigid tõsiselt oma ekspordi pärast muret tundma hakkavad? Kus on taluvuspiir?
  • ECB prioriteet number üks on hindade stabiilsus. Po**** see eksport. Meie tarbime ise!
  • Morgan Stanley natuke contrarian view EUR-USD osas vastukaaluks paljude väidetele, et USD nõrgeneb bail-outi peale:

    USD OUTLOOK: NATIONALIZATION DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN A WEAKER CURRENCY - STEPHEN JEN AT MORGAN STANLEY
    - "Conventional wisdom has it that, as a government fiscalises the contingent liabilities of nationalised banks, the currency of the country in question should depreciate. More generally, banking crises are, very often, accompanied by balance of payments (or currency) crises. The US, being a country with still out-sized ‘twin deficits’ (fiscal and external deficits), will likely see the dollar weaken because of the Treasury and the Fed’s decision to effectively nationalise some of the large financial institutions, so the argument goes. An inconvenient fact, however, is that nationalisation of banks, historically, did not tend to lead to further currency weakness. In fact, very often the financial sector and the currency in question reach a trough just as the government takes steps to address the banking crisis. Thus, currency weakness tends to precede, not follow nationalisation."
    - "The historical pattern suggests that financial markets tend to be forward-looking and try to price in the deterioration in the state of the banking system by selling down the currency and financial sector stocks, but the government is usually not compelled to act until conditions deteriorate significantly. As a result, more often than not, government interventions have coincided with the lows in currency values. In other words, even though K&R’s observation that currency crises often occur simultaneously with banking crises is correct, there is no strong proof that nationalisation leads to further currency weakness."
    - "In sum, banking crises are unambiguously bad for currencies, but nationalisation per se does not make the situation worse for currencies. In fact, it often marks the low in the currencies."
    - "Investors will likely see it as key for the next Administration to control spending. However, it is also important for investors to appreciate how sensitive US revenue collection is to GDP. During 2001-02, for example, as the US economy fell into a brief recession, revenue collection plummeted from 21% of GDP to close to 16%. Thus, the strength of the US economic recovery in the coming years will have important implications for the overall budget position. These fundamental trends in revenue collection and ‘core’ spending are at least as important as the costs associated with nationalisation. The performance of the dollar in the coming years will, therefore, be a function of how the US government deals with spending and how rapidly the US economy recovers, in our view."
  • Rehatrader, see hetk on juba üldiselt käes. 1,6000 peal olid ministrid juba üsna häälekad. Aga nagu TaivoS juba ütles: ECB on monomandaadiga asutus ja selleks ainsaks mandaadiks on hinnastabiilsuse tagamine. Ekspordi või GDP kasvu boostimine enne CPI tampimist on no-go!
  • WSJ reports the SEC said shortly after midnight Monday that it would revise rules to curb short selling that it had issued just three days before. The SEC's latest change of direction on short selling caught some market participants off guard and prompted criticism that the agency has miscalculated the impact of its rulemaking. The SEC, in a release issued at 12:26 a.m. EST Monday, reversed a position it had taken Friday when it said that market makers couldn't short financial stocks after Friday. The new rules as of Monday: Those engaged in bona fide market making and hedging activity, including in derivative contracts, could continue to short. "The purpose of this accommodation is to permit market makers to continue to provide liquidity to the markets," the SEC explained in the revised order. To try to prevent short sellers from using market makers to take big positions, the SEC said market makers couldn't short for a customer if it would give them a net short position in the security.
  • Ülaltoodud lõigu kohta veel niipalju, et see päästab ära turu tegijad (market makers) ja aitab ehk kaasa ka SKF ja UYG taas normaalsemale käitumisele aja jooksul.
  • Küsimus/loogika: Kui on keelatud finatsasutuste put optsioonid (ära hoidmaks liigset spekuleerimist ?), siis ei saa ju aktsiaomanikud enam languse vastu ennast kindlustada ja peaks toimuma laus müük, et riske maandada ? Sest kes tahab omada aktsiaid kui languse vastu ei saa kindlustada ja tulevik on tume.
    On see nii ??
  • Mezaks,

    mu eelmine postitus peaks ka sinu küsimusele vastama. Kuna turutegijate poolt lühikeseks müük lubatud, siis on võimalik ka optsiooniturgu teha.
  • Wait for Despair
    By Rev Shark
    RealMoney.com Contributor
    9/23/2008 7:50 AM EDT

    One day I sat thinking, almost in despair; a hand fell on my shoulder and a voice said reassuringly, "Cheer up, things could get worse." So I cheered up and, sure enough, things got worse.
    -- James Hagerty

    The market mood is growing increasingly grim as politicians argue over socializing hundreds of billions in banking losses, and crude oil and the dollar trade in chaotic fashion. The big reversal on Monday went a long way in undermining the brief bout of confidence that result from the euphoria over a bailout and forced short squeeze we had on Thursday and Friday. Market players are quickly coming to the realization that we have some huge problems out there that are not going to be quickly solved.

    The big problem with this giant bailout is that rather than boost confidence, it scared many investors who really had no idea that things were in such poor shape. The market has been flopping around like a fish out of water all year and the issues in the banking sector were out there, but until they heard the word "trillion," many didn't realize how deep the problems were.

    Unfortunately the market has not done a very good job of fully discounted the extent of the losses, and in fact still doesn't seem to have a very good idea of how bad they are. The good news is that at least we are now engaged in the process of recognizing the losses and adjusting expectations. It might take a while for the process to play out, but at least we are no longer burying our heads in the sand and ignoring the issues that have been out there for an awfully long time.

    And now what? As I've said many times, bad markets tend to wear you out rather than scare you out. The bottom will be found amid gloom and despair rather than fear and hysteria. It is when market players start to believe they can never make money again and want nothing to do with stocks that we will slowly begin to turn the corner.

    We certainly have made progress toward that sort of misery, but we aren't going to know the exact low point until sometime after the fact. Our job isn't to guess exactly when we reach the nadir, but to stay safe, let it play out and be ready to invest when we start to shows some signs of sustained recovery.

    So many investors add to the collective misery by buying too soon in hopes of catching the ultimate low. They are sucked in by the siren song of bottom calls by pundits who ignore the wreckage they cause with their continued attempts to seek glory.

    As I see folks who are down 20% or more for the year, I'm amazed to see the same old stories about the futility of timing the market. We are told to hold on tight because things are sure to get better. Yes, they will, and if you don't have to make up huge losses when they do, you will be far, far ahead.

    The problem is that too many folks ignored the problems in this market for way too long and now they feel they have no choice but to sit there and do nothing. Instead of using disciplined methods to take them out of weak positions, they embraced the serial bottom-callers and bullish arguments and relied on hope.

    It makes me angry that so many in Wall Street encourage passivity for individual investors who have the ability to be highly flexible. Those investors are now paying a tremendous price for it and are told to just continue to wait and do nothing.

    Many of these folks will be the ones who finally give up in a fit of despair, and that is when the real bottom will eventually come. So be patient, but don't do it while sitting on lots of positions.

    We have a slightly soft start this morning as the very poor news flow continues and gold and oil reverse some of yesterday's big gains.
    -----------------------------
    Ülespoole avanevad:

    In reaction to strong earnings/guidance: COMS +10.5%, CC +8.8%, UNP +1.6%... M&A news: IMCL +6.1% (Bristol-Myers Squibb raises bid for ImClone Systems to $62.00 per share)... Select airline stocks ticking higher with crude lower: NWA +4.2%, LCC +3.5%, AMR +3.4%, UAUA +3.4%, CAL +2.9%... Other news: DSL +20.6% (names Charles R. Rinehart Chief Executive Officer), AIG +9.7% and ABK +6.8% (still checking for anything specific), ABX +2.3% and AEM +1.6% (Cramer makes positive comments on MadMoney)... Analyst comments: ATML +4.7% (initiated with a Buy at UBS), NLY +2.5% (upgraded to Buy at Merrill).

    Allapoole avanevad:

    In reaction to disappointing earnings/guidance: CACH -11.6% (also downgraded to Hold at Roth)... Select financial related stocks showing weakness: WM -9.6% (Moody's downgrades WM's covered bond ratings to Baa1, on review), LYG -8.6%, WB -8.5%, UBS -6.8%, CS -5.1%, RF -3.8% (downgraded to Sell at Citigroup), ING -2.5%, BCS -1.4%... Select metals/mining names showing weakness with lower spot prices: RTP -11.9% (has signalled its intention to move away from traditional long-term contracts and instead increase amount of sales both into the spot market and through so-called hybrid contracts - FT), AAUK -6.6%, GFI -4.6%, BHP -4.5%, DROOY -4.1%, HMY -3.4%, BBL -2.8%, GLD -1.5%... Select drybulk shippers trading lower: EXM -5.0%, DSX -3.1%, DRYS -3.0%, EGLE -2.7%... Other news: CEF -9.2% (announces that it plans to offer Class A Shares of Central Fund to the public in Canada and the United States under its existing $750 mln base shelf prospectus), HGR -6.2% (announces underwritten public offering by shareholder of 2.5 mln shares)... Analyst comments: EPIC -4.7% (downgraded to Underperform at Cowen), STM -3.9% (downgraded to Neutral at JPMorgan), DXPE -3.1% (downgraded to Hold at Jesup & Lamont), GE -2.5% (downgraded to Neutral at Merrill), MU -2.3% (downgraded to Perform at Oppenheimer), CHS -2.3% (downgraded to Neutral from Buy at Piper Jaffray).
  • U.S. financial rescue plan will have very positive impact on mortgage markets, according to White House
    ;-)
  • Aga ei julgeks ka vastu vaielda...
    Bloombergis täna video, kus Goldman Sachsi Jim O'Neill (Head of Global Economic Research) räägib, et majanduslanguse oht on oluliselt vähenenud ning peale kahte aastat negatiivset nägemust on nad pärast $700B bailouti kinnisvaraturu suhtes positiivseks muutumas.
  • Et siis riik kompenseerib pahad laenud ja võib jälle rahvale kontrollimatult laene anda, mis viib majanduskasvule? Huvitav, et Eesti sellist varianti ei kasuta.
  • Madis,
    päris ülivõrdes on ehk vara hakata hõiskama
    see pigem pingutus sentimenti toetada
  • Fedil on hea meetod naftahinda allapoole lükata - lase aga mõni pank pankrotti ja läheb nagu iseenesest! :-D
  • Käive jällegi üsna kesine ning hetkeseisuga jääb eilselegi päevale alla! Bernanke ja Paulsoni kõnest pole eriti toetust saadud, kuid päev veel väga noor ja sõnavõtjaid veel mitmeid.
  • Hetkel võtab sõna SEC-i Cox, mis sealt tulemas on?
  • Bernanke Comments

    Think of securities having two prices: 1) Fire Sale- sold today into a bad market; 2) Hold to Maturity Price- when an asset is allowed to mature to proper value... says fire sale price has been dominant in the market... says doing away with mark-to-market accounting would further drive down confidence... believes auctions could be designed to provide a proper mark to maturity price; if the Fed is able to do this banks would be able to account for those assets more accurately; this would bring liquidity back to the markets; the confidence would bring private equity back to the markets; says tax payers should hold mark-to-maturity values so they are not on the hook... need experts in place to run these auctions; says beneficiaries are not just those who sell the asset but all market participants... says reform of the financial industry is necessary but believes this program is separate given the severity of the situation...
  • Huvitav, mis siis saab, kui kongress plaani heaks EI kiida.
    Paulson, Bernanke, Cox kõik on täna päev otsa rääkinud, kui pekkis finantssüsteem on. Siis peaks järelikult RÄIGE crash tulema ju?
  • PS Starmani võrgus saab Bloomberg TV pealt seda tsirkust pealt vaadata.
  • ma mõtsi kah nõndaviisi, et kui kongress EI ütleb, et kas siis on räige crash tulemas.. aga mõeldes poliitikute peale ja mõeldes mis on valikud:
    a) kindel, et kui 700 miljardit ei köhi, siis on crash
    b)pole välistatud, et 700 miljardi köhimine ei päästa meid crashist

    ..kui üks on kindel, aga teine ebalev, minnakse ikka kindla peale ;)
  • Tehtud küll selle aasta veebruaris, aga ikkagi... 3 ja pool minutit. Time well spent: )

  • Domeenist väljuvad lingid võiks olla uues aknas avanevad :P
  • Broker Buy-In Notice

    Here is an alert that went out to customers of a prominent online broker: Please be aware that today is the first day that short stock sales transacted after the SEC's Emergency Order of 2008-09-18 will settle and become subject to hard T+3 close-out if the broker is unable to deliver the stock this afternoon. Your account has been identified as holding a short position as of the 2008-09-18 close and which therefore may be subject to buy in today in order to ensure compliance with this Order. We are currently in the process of determining what quantity of shares, if any, is available either internally or through third party borrows to meet our settlement obligation and will know that later today. We anticipate sending to you by approximately 12:00 PM Eastern Time a notice of your short positions which we are unable to cover and which will be bought in by broker if you fail to act and close our your short positions in a timely manner.

    Seega lühikesed positsioonid võivad minna sundkatmisele!
  • Sellest ka ilmselt tänane tõus, kuna täna saab T+3 täis. Ehk siis homme võib teistpidi müügisurvet tulla, kui hakatakse likvideerima soovimatult kontole ilmunud positsioone. Tundub, et shordi katmine pole piisav ehk siis võib teistpidi pika positsiooni otsas lõpetada tänase päeva lõpuks.
  • Late Day Sector Strength:
    REITS- ICF +3.5%, Real Estate- IYR +2.9%, Nat Gas- UNG +2.4%, Tech.- XLK +1.3%, QQQQ +0.90%, Seims- SMH +1.1%, Internet HLDRS- HHH +1.2%, Telecom +0.90%.

    Late Day Sector Weakness:
    Steel- SLX -4.5%, Base Metals- DBB -3.7%, Regional Banks- KRE -3.0%, Coal- KOL -2.9%, Gas- UGA -2.6%, Homebuilders- XHB -2.8%, Materials- XLB -2.3%, IYM -2.2%, Ag/Chem- MOO -2.2%
     

  • Briefingust kokkuvõte tänase istungi kohta:

    I must credit the Senate Banking Committee, as they did not pull out the usual grandstanding that is generally seen in these hearings (although there were plenty of repetitive questions). The issue at hand are: 1) Where does the $700 bln figure come from and would the Fed and Treasury be able to work with a tranche-type system: The $700 bln was to ensure Paulson, Bernanke, et al that they would have enough money to battle the issue at hand and that the amount being issued was necessary to calm market fears. They also thought that a healthy backstop would finally intrigue a private equity market that has been sitting on the sidelines. Paulson/Bernanke also conveyed that they would not necessarily use the full $700 bln but wanted to have it on hand. Basically, it seems to me that they just do not want to have to go back in front of this committee with their hat in hand and get grilled two months down the road. The problem here is that they used language on a couple of occasions that suggested that they could get by with less. Perhaps they simply used the age old sales technique of asking for more than they want and they would be perfectly fine with an amount in the neighborhood of $500 bln. Regardless I think that it is very likely that any bill passed will be set up in tranches as no one in the Senate is going to want to stick their necks out, especially when Paulson is likely to be gone in three months and neither one was very convincing in translating that this would be the final solution to the problems; 2) Executive compensation: House Rep Frank (who will lead tomorrows Joint Economic Committee session) has stated that the House would never pass a bill that did not have a provision for executive compensation. Paulson and Bernanke have stated that in order for the plan to work they must be able to attract better institutions that are not in trouble in order to extract the best pricing. They have also stated that they would like to have the best in the profession involved to ensure a return to taxpayers. This issue is likely to be a contentious one but I would expect to see Frank win out on this as the outcry from the public is likely to be big. There would likely be a concession on Frank's part on the cap, but all numbers discussed so far have been theoretical; 3) Regulatory issues: It would appear that everyone is on the same page that the current regulatory set up is archaic and there is a much needed update. However, this will be a secondary thought as most agree the primary issue at hand is the credit markets and assuaging fear in the markets. When these discussions do resume perhaps the two items that will undergo the biggest change are the CDS and insurance industry. I would expect the majority of the banking regulation to be covered by the G7's Financial Stability Forum which is currently providing suggestions on sweeping banking reform; 4) Oversight of the plan: While not included in the plan, Mr. Paulson and Mr. Bernanke assumed that some type of oversight committee would be formed so this is likely to be a non-issue. Who they put in charge could be the bigger debate, however, it is too early to speculate on names; 5) What are they other options available: Certainly one of the bigger issues that the committee had with Bernanke and Mr. Paulson was that they were unable to offer any alternatives to the current plan. I am sure they have some plans but that they kept those cards up their sleeves, likely waiting for the Banking Committee response before they offered up alternatives; 6) Pricing of the securities: Mr. Bernanke bought up a great argument of the fire sale verse the mark to maturity that will make the difference of the cost and/or profit to the taxpayer. This is an issue that can be debated all night but until the Fed/Treasury begin the process it is all just a theoretical argument. Both sides brought up interesting points, but I would have to side with Bernanke/Paulson in that you need to open up the system to all institutions good and bad, so that you have a better opportunity of receiving a mark to maturity prices. As stated above this is purely a theoretical argument and one can make as many assumptions until the process starts. This could very well give the 'tranche-style' argument a lot of teeth; 7) Type of securities: The type of security will likely be clearly defined in any agreement. Mr. Paulson stated that he would like to leave this open to any type of security until the problem is clearly defined, noting a domino style effect the credit markets can have. The Senate seemed to be a little nervous giving this broad based power and was looking to limit it to mortgage-based securities. Mr. Paulson did say that the plan was to work on one security at a time starting with MBS' so obviously that will not be an issue. Whether or not it would allow the Fed/Treasury to dabble in student loans, car loans, etc will be debated with a likely middle of the road solution presented... Bottom Line: There is no way the proposal will pass the way it is worded right now, but that really should not come as a surprise to anyone. There does appear to be a motivation to get a deal done quickly and a plan in place. After tomorrow we should have some better insight as to how the Senate Banking Committee and Joint Economic Committee are viewing the plans at which point Bernanke and Paulson will go back to the draft board and hammer out the necessary changes for the plan to pass votes in the Senate and the House. Based on commentary today I would think a likely completion date for this plan is around October 5th. If that is the case look for a lot of uncertainty in the markets over the next two weeks, especially in currency markets.
  • GS ralli turu lõpus oli ilmselgelt forced covering.. kasutasin seda putide võtmiseks.
  • On keegi Sigaretitööstusel silma peal hoidmas?

    Kas sisenemine Reynolds American Inc. (RAI) pikana võiks olla sobiv hetk? Saan aru, et aktsiahind on peamiselt pihta saanud tänu Altria Group Inc. (MO) USTi omandamisele, mis on jätnud RAI viimase turunishis teisejärguliseks mängijaks. Ehk siis suuresti emotsionaalne liikumine.

    RAI viimased majandustulemused ei anna põhjust pessimismiks ja pika positsiooni loogika peitub suuresti arusaamal, et sõltuvustarbimisest ei loobuta reeglina ka piiratumate finantsresursside olukorras.

  • jim minuarust jah päris karm värk. Ma sarnastaks seda karu maha laskmise ja kontoll lasuga. Arvestades seisu kuidas AAPL 122 pealt jooksis 145 peale :) ning täna on juba tagasi 126 peal.

    Siis noh jah mul on selline tunne et karudel on elusast peast kerad küljest lõigatud.
  • OFC Corp Office Props announces offering of 2 mln shares
    EQY Equity One announces launch of offering of 2.2 mln common stock
    SF Stifel Financial announces proposed offering for 1.2 mln shares
    FPO First Potomac Realty launches public offering of 2.5 mln shares

    Palunostkehästipaljumeieaktsiaid.com
  • jim a kas see mitte ei lahjenda suppi ja ei vii aktsia hinda veelgi räigemalt alla ?
  • No kõik kaanivad elu eest kapitali juurde. Kuniks elu!
  • GS Goldman Sachs says Berkshire to invest $5 bln in Goldman preferred; says its raising $2.5 bln in common stock offering - Bloomberg

    Selgus tegelik põhjus Goldmani tõusuks :)
  • GS announced that it has reached an agreement to sell $5 bln of perpetual preferred stock to Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A) in a private offering. The preferred stock has a dividend of 10% and is callable at any time at a 10% premium. In conjunction with this offering, Berkshire Hathaway will also receive warrants to purchase $5 billion of common stock with a strike price of $115 per share, which are exercisable at any time for a five year term. In addition, GS is raising at least $2.5 bln in common equity in a public offering.

    a) 10% intress eelisaktsiatel? Huh, pole just väga soodne intress.
    b) Warrantid $115 peal ja kestavad 5 aastat?! Can you say dilution?
    c) Public offering $2.5 bln..

    Ühesõnaga, natuke lisab optimismi küll, aga võimas dilution on tulemas. Oleks võimalik, siis shordiks praegu $136.5 pealt. See on ajutine pop, mis müüakse alla tagasi.
  • Veel parem bet oleks MS short @ $32, ajuvaba õhukese turu küllhommetulebshortsqueeze-ülereaktsioon.
  • jim, 10% pole praegusel eelisaktsiaturul üldse kõrge, ma arvan, et kõik oleks valmis Buffetti selle intressiga sisse võtma. Ning preferred turg on praegu (pärast Lehmanit) uue raha mõttes põhimõtteliselt kinni, seega kuuldavasti ka 15% pole tase mille pealt oldaks valmis tegema.

    b) Warrantid - see nii positiivne pole jah, kuna hinnatase üsna madal. Peaks küll täpsemalt tingimusi uurima, kuid sisuliselt Buffettil optsioon suvalisel hetkel 115 pealt aktsiaid soetada.
    c) secondary offering üksi oleks väga negatiivne, kuid selles kompotis neelatakse alla. Seega ma ei ole nii väga kindel, et siit shortida tasuks (see küll nagunii teoreetiline jutt), nädala algusega karud jälle julgust kogunud ning seetõttu paljud valetpidi positsioneeritud.
  • Senised Goldmani eelisaktsiate dividendid

    Kuna 3-kuu LIBOR on hetkel ca 2.8%, siis senised eelisaktsiate dividendid on umbes 3,5% juures olnud. Nüüd siis 10%.
  • PS Berkshire on juba ca $1 bln plussis oma investeeringuga, ma võtaks kasumit siit :D
  • Kogu see diil kannab GS seisukohast ainult ühte eesmärki:
    "Vaadake meid!!!!!! Buffet investeerib meisse!!!!! Vaadake! NÜÜD!"

    Mis see "callable at any time at a 10% premium" tähendab?
  • GS tõstab raha sellistel tingimustel - pmst on ikka väga sitad lood. BRKA võtab sisuliselt marginaalse riski, koorib korraliku divika ja juhul kui maakera ei plahvata, võtab kunagi 4-5 aasta pärast 10% ettevõttest $115-ga. Just see, et ta nõudis warranteid ja ei olnud nõus commonisse kohe raha panema näitab, mis seis on. Pmst võiks BRKA üldse hakata frantsiisilepingu alusel "Buffet invests in this company!" kaubamärki müüma. Müüd 100 taala eest ennast Buffetile 10-ks aastaks orjaks ja võid vastutasuks kleepeka kontori uksele kleepida. Kusagil on mingi piir, kust maalt muidu usaldust tekitav diil hakkab halvasti lõhnama, see diil on kaugel teisel pool seda piiri.
  • "Callable at any time at a 10% premium" tähendab seda, et Goldman võib võla igal ajal tagasi maksta laenujääk + 10%.

    Veel mõningaid mõtteid diilist:

    * "Annualized return on average tangible common shareholders' equity was 8,8% for the third quarter of 2008". Samas makstakse nüüd 10% dividendi eelisaktsiatele.. Tõsi küll, 9 kuu põhjal oli return 16,3%.

    * Goldmani Jan 2011 $120 strikega callide sulgemishind oli $37. Arvestades, et Buffetil on strike madalam ja aeg pikem, siis ilmselt 2013 $115 callid, mille Buffet sisuliselt sai, oleks väärt ca $50-60 ühe calli kohta. Ei viitsi kuskil optsioonikalkulaatoris läbi mängida, midagi sinnakanti peaks tulema. 5 mld dollari jagu warranteid $115 hinnaga, see tähendab ca 43.5 mln calli, mille väärtus kokku oleks vähemalt $2,1 bln. Seega siis Buffet investeeris $5 bln ja sai koheselt vastu vähemalt $2,1 bln, netoinvesteering maksimaalselt $2,9 bln.. Ehk siis arusaadav, miks Buffet sellise investeeringu tegi, $500 mln aastas $2,9 bln pealt tähendaks 17% aastatulusust.. ja siinjuures olen ma kõiki numbreid pigem allapoole ümardanud ja alahinnanud.

    * Natuke ajalugu uurides selgus: kui Buffet Salomoni investeeris, siis ta ostetud stock oli konverteeritav hinnaga $38. Aktsia käis aga sellest tunduvalt allpool ära, $27 juures, kui probleemid laiemalt tuntuks said..

    * Arvestame dilutionit järgmiseks aastaks: kasumiks oodatakse $16 dollarit aktsia kohta ehk siis kokku ca 6,8 mld dollarit (428 mln aktsiat). Arvestame siit maha $500 mln lisakulu eelisaktsiate dividendidena, alles jääb $6,3 mld. Public offering tulemusena kasvab aktsiate arv ca 2,5 bln / $125 per share = 20 mln võrra. Seega aktsiaid ca 448 mln ja 2009 EPS tuleks ca $14 - ca 12,5% dilution. Kui arvestada ka Buffeti warranteid 43 mln aktsiale, siis oleks aktsiate arv 491 mln ja 2009 EPS $12,8.

    * Siinjuures ei arvestanud aga ülejäänud intressikulu. Goldmani intressikulu kolmandas kvartalis oli $7,5 mld ja netokasum $800 mln. Piisab kasvõi intressikulu kasvust 10% võrra ja kasumist saab kahjum. Raske öelda, mis hinnaga see kapital Goldmani jaoks hetkel on ja mis osadest see koosneb. Siiski pakuks, et intressikulud on pigem kasvamas, kuna paljuski on tegemist lühiajalise finantseerimisega ja kapitali hind Goldmanile on praegu kindlasti kõrgem kui näiteks 3 kuud tagasi.

    Ühesõnaga, mulle tundub, et positiivne reaktsioon on puhtalt headline peale ja sisu on pigem vastupidine: Goldman on omadega niivõrd hädas, et on pidanud pakkuma Buffetile väga hea diili.
  • gs-i ja buffetti puhul veel huvitav tähele panna, et gs on üks kahest investment bankist, mille teenuseid buffett kasutab
  • See Salomoni näide on vist tänase GS-iga võrreldav selles osas, et keegi täpselt ei oska öelda, kui suure riskiga järgmise J. Meriwether'i bande oma siiani kasumlikke ärisid ajanud on. See osa võrrandist on Unkown unknowns - we simply don't know.

Teemade nimekirja